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The Chancellor's Foot Begins to Kick:
Judicial Remedies in Public Law




In 1955 the Supreme Court of the United States, in implement-
ing the landmark decision Brown v. The Board of Education,'
claimed without comment the general equitable powers of federal
courts to cure constitutional ills.2 The Court noted, "Traditionally,
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies. . . .These cases call for the exercise of these traditional
attributes of equity power."3  In the quarter-century following
Brown federal courts have become increasingly enmeshed in public
law cases, that is, cases in which the object of litigation is the vindi-
* "Equity is a roguish thing. For Law wee have a measure know what to trust too.
Equity is according to ye conscience of him yt is Chancellor, and as yt is larger or narrower soe
is equity. Its all one as if they should make ye Standard for ye measure wee call a foot, to be
ye Chancellors foot; what an uncertain measure would this be; one Chancellor ha's a long foot
another a short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis ye same thing in ye Chancellors Con-
science." Table Talk of John Selden 43 (edited by Sir Frederick Pollock for the Selden Society,
London: Quaritch, 1927).
** J.D. Georgetown University, 1967, A.B. Princeton University, 1964, Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Seton Hall University Law Center. The author acknowledges with thanks the
diligent assistance of Mr. Mark Janetsko, Seton Hall Law Center, in the research and prepara-
tion of this article.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). Following the momentous decision on the merits, the
Court set the cases specially for argument concerning the remedy.
2. Since general equitable powers were always available to federal courts under article
III of the United States Constitution, Brown did not actually "create new equitable remedies; it
highlighted the desirability of expanding traditional equity powers to accommodate new cir-
cumstances." Comment, Equitable Remedies- An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neo-
receiverships to Implement Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1178
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Utilization of Neoreceiverships ].
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown 11). Before deciding the
difficult issues concerning remedies the Court took the most unusual step of inviting briefs and
arguments on that issue from the Attorneys General of the United States and of all states then
practicing segregation of races in public education.
cation of statutory or constitutional policies rather than individual
rights.' In the process, the courts have enormously expanded their
influence and their function. Racial discrimination,' government
benefits programs, 6 housing,7 conditions of confinement and treat-
ment in state institutions,8 land use,9 environment,' ° quality of pub-
lic education," and legislative apportionment 2 typify, but by no
means exhaust, the comprehensive range of problems amenable to
judicial intervention under modern interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment' 3 and ever increasing legislative programs.4
4. Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1284
(1976). The term "public law litigation" as defined by Chayes encompasses that portion of
modem litigation that departs substantially from the classic concept of bipolar disputes be-
tween private parties about past completed events resulting in a judgment granting or denying
damages. Id at 1282-83. Rather,
[tihe party structure is sprawling and amorphous, subject to change over the course of
the litigation. The traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed with
negotiating and mediating processes at every point. The judge is the dominant figure
in organizing and guiding the case, and he draws for support not only on the parties
and their counsel, but on a wide range of outsiders-masters, experts, and oversight
personnel.
Id at 1284. See also Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L.
REV. 791 (1976).
Statistics from Chayes, supra, at 1303, n.93, reflect the dramatic increase in public law
cases.
5. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Alabama v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962). See generaly Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of
School Integration, 39 LAW & CONT. PROBS. 7 (1975).
6. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Perez
v. Lavine, 412 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 312
F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I.), aft'd, 435 F.2d 807 (lst Cir. 1970).
8. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom, Wyatt v.
Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194
(8th Cir. 1974); Nelson v. Hyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136 (8th Cir. 1973);Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Morales v. Turman,
364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Penn-
sylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
9. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mt. Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972), affd, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975); Pascak Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (1974).
10. See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521
F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), consolidated de sub nom, EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) per
curiam (reversed and remanded to consider motions in light of EPA's concession that modifi-
cations in their regulations were needed) (Court avoided for the moment the issue whether
Congress can order a state to draft an implementation plan or to enforce an EPA promulgated
plan).
11. See Keyes v. School Dist., 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066 (1974); Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd, 512 F.2d
37 (2nd Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, - N.J. -, - A.2d- (1978).
12. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of
Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Karpral v. Jepson, 271 F.
Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1967).
13. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 283-300 (1977).
14. Justice Burger, noting this increase, has called for a "judicial impact statement" to
accompany all new legislation. Address by Chief Justice Burger, ABA Annual Convention
(1977), (reprinted in 63 ABA J. 504, 505 (1977)).
And yet, the involvement of American courts in all areas of
public concern is scarcely novel. Our peculiar federal constitutional
system, with courts the final arbiters, has long made judicial consid-
eration of varied social policy issues a commonplace.' 5 What has
changed and has drawn public attention-and increasingly an-
ger- 16 is the courts' provision of comprehensive and ongoing reme-
dies in the growing number of public law cases. The judiciary has
not fashioned these remedies uniformly; rather, they have simply
evolved ad hoc remedial approaches that, although substantively
correct, are procedurally fraught with many potentials for abuse.
This article seeks to evaluate the process and methodology
adopted by courts in the remedial phase of public law cases. It is
argued that the current level of judicial involvement has neither a
historical nor a functional basis and cannot be justified merely by a
passing obligatory reference to "inherent equitable powers."' 7
Courts must understand and adapt to their changing social role by
developing codified procedures for receiving and acting upon infor-
mation germane to the remedial phase. To this end it is suggested
that methods that have historically served to instill public confidence
in the integrity and justice of the judicial process should be utilized.
Only in this way can the many salutory developments of the public
law era be maintained without undermining traditional public ex-
pectations of a neutral and orderly judiciary.
II. Scope of the Problem
A. Early Equity Power
As it has been used by American jurists the term "equity" is
fundamentally ambiguous.' 8 On one hand, the term has a primarily
historical referent, amounting more or less to Maitland's glib
formula, "Equity is that body of rules which is administered. . . by
• . . Courts of Equity."' 9 On the other hand, there is a more com-
plex, normative connotation by which "equity" refers to the need in
individual cases to disregard admittedly sound rules to serve better
15. deTocqueville's insight led him to conclude in 1830 that "Scarcely a political ques-
tion arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." I
A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 280 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
16. See, e.g., Newsweek Jan. 1, 1977, at 42; U.S. News & World Report, Jun. 19, 1976, at
29; Time Nov. 13, 1977, at 1.
17. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971): "Once a
right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. Id.
at 15.
18. See, e.g., text accompanying note 3 supra.
19. A. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION TO COMMON LAW (1929). See
also W. WALSH, WALSH ON EQUITY 1, 2 (1930).
the ultimate goal of justice.2" In this context, the courts have used
terms like "inherent" equitable powers as a vague blanket covering
both the historical and the functionl justifications for a proposed
course of action. Although this use may serve well enough to resolve
doubts about the general power to act, it is simply not acceptable,
either logically, legally, or popularly, when dealing with the methods
and procedures that ought to be employed in fashioning novel reme-
dies. Equitable relief is becoming so increasingly important in mod-
em litigation that equitable remedies can no longer be accurately
called extraordinary,2" particularly in public law cases. Moreover,
while the Constitution expressly provides that "[tlhe judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Con-
stitution [and] the Laws of the United States,"22 little in the history
of English Chancery23 can buttress a claim that courts have inherent
power to fashion complex and ongoing remedies in cases involving
the operations of government. Indeed, the notion that courts have
inherent equitable power to fashion complex institutional remedies
is without specific historical foundation and has been applied in a
manner that threatens unprincipled application of the courts' power
to imprison for contempt.24
Antecedents of the English Court of Chancery have been identi-
fied as early as the twelfth century. At that time the office of Chan-
cellor was administrative, the King himself being the direct source of
its authority and the arbiter of its actions. Cases were given individ-
ualized treatment, and rules were largely lacking. 25 This was natural
in view of the unquestioned supremacy of the Royal authority; there
was, quite literally, no separation of powers problem.26 Later, from
1461 until 1603, the Office of Chancery functioned for the first time
20. See generally R. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 11, 12
(1961); J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 48-51 (5th ed. 1941).
21. Chayes, supra note 4, at 1292.
22. U.S. CONST. Art. III, sec. 2.
23. For clarity, the English court will be uniformly referred to in this article as the Court
of Chancery. This is not intended to imply that the court's administrative origins outweighed
its equitable functions, but is designed to minimize duplication of the term in multiple con-
texts.
24. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text infra.
Historically, the court's civil contempt power to imprison those who disobeyed its orders
was confined to the Court of Chancery. It is generally held that Lord Coke's quarrel with the
Chancery in 1616 was "lost" because the latter courts, utilizing the contempt power, could
effectively block enforcement of common-law judgments in difficult cases. For an interesting
and largely differing opinion, see Gray, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function, 20 AMER. J.
OF LEGAL HISTORY 192 (1976).
25. The office of Chancellor and his role in court reform during the twelfth century are
recounted in Green, The Centralization of Norman Justice under Henry II, (reprinted in AALS,
Select Essays in Anglo-American History, 121 (1907)). Maitland traces the origin of Chancery
Courts at least to the Thirteenth Century, A. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 2.
26. "The Justices of the Eyre were in a very special sense impersonations of the King
who had received authority. . . to hearken to give amends for any complaint. Bolland,
27 Selden Society, Eyre of Kent II, 28-29.
Apparently, during this early period the Chancellor might be said to have provided an
as a court, with little direct oversight from the king; the chancellors
were men of the Church, and their rule of decision was their con-
science. 27 As the volume of cases increased with the development of
modem systems of commerce and industry, the need for orderly ad-
judication and predictable decisionmaking became the primary so-
cial need, and the Court of Chancery came under increasing
criticism. 28 Finally, during the seventeenth century judges schooled
in structure of the common-law systematically reformed the Chan-
cery Courts, and molded as their rules of decision a cluster of sub-
stantive principles, known familiarly today as the maxims of
equity.29 Case precedent became not only relevant, but controlling,
and the English Chancery courts soon evolved coherent and consis-
tent rules governing their decisions.3"
Thus, although the Chancery system existed in England for
seven centuries, for half that time the chancellor acted as an admin-
istrative official responsible to the king. Furthermore, the Chancery
Court operated as an independent judicial body under a rule of con-
science ie., individualized decisionmaking, only from about 1461 to
1603. Thereafter, Chancery utilized rules and principles in the same
manner as had the common-law courts and in fact drew on the great
common-law practitioners to develop these rules. Moreover, follow-
ing the Chancery Court's evolution into a true judicial institution,
the remedies it actually afforded were confined to matters concerning
specific performance, trusts and mortgages, and even these were used
only sparingly with due regard for the capability of the court to carry
out its mandate. 3' More importantly, though relief against the sover-
eign himself was afforded in some cases (notably those involving
royal seizure of land32 ), the relief depended directly upon the con-
sent of the king to submit himself to the decision of the court in each
case. For much of its history, an application to the Chancellor was,
in effect, an application to the king himself and not a judicial pro-
administrative remedy to those aggrieved by the judicial process, though the Chancellor him-
self was not part of that process. Green, supra note 25, at 122-23.
27. Because the men who occupied the office during this time were, for the most part,
men of integrity and ability, the Court of Chancery was generally respected as an honest and
just institution. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity, 12 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 81, 100 (1934).
28. Even as Ellesmere was championing the cause of the Court of Chancery to establish
parity, if not primacy, in its competition with Coke and the common-law courts, he recognized
the fundamental defects in a wholly discretionary system. See Severns, supra note 27, at 105-
06.
29. These maxims were developed chiefly in the period 1675-1756 by two great lawyers
of common-law background, Finch and Hardwicke. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity part 2,
13 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 305, 305-06 (1935).
30. Procedural reforms lacked far behind, however. Chancery procedures were to be-
come progressively more cumbersome until the efforts of Bentham and the stinging criticism of
Dickens aroused sufficient public clamor to compel reform in the nineteenth century. See
Severns, supra, note 29, at 314-325.
31. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES, 105 (1973).
32. A. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 4.
ceeding.33
It has often been assumed that the well known formula ubijus
ibi remedium34 manifests inherent comprehensive power in early
English courts to devise remedies in any situation. In Dicey's words,
"[T]here runs through the English constitution that inseparable con-
nection between the means of enforcing a right and the right to be
enforced which is the strength of judicial legislation."3 One must
understand, however, that the admirable connection that Dicey de-
scribed was made in legislation such as the Habeas Corpus Acts and
in no way stemmed from inherent judicial power to expand jurisdic-
tion to confer remedies. Indeed, any judicial initiatives into these
areas were readily subject to control under much more limited defer-
ence accorded judicial review in British "constitutional" cases.
36
Hence, the historical development of Chancery in England has
been such that it was subject at all times to the control of either the
king or parliament. Chancery never operated with the total indepen-
dence that characterizes American courts interpreting a written con-
stitution.37 Understanding this difference is fundamental to an
evaluation of modem court procedures, particularly when federal
court interpretation of a written constitution directly infringes upon
governmental functions of state and local governments in an exten-
sive and ongoing fashion.
B. Federal Court Application of its Inherent Power to Fashion
Remedies
Although the English court system did not anticipate modem
public law remedies, judicial references to "inherent equitable pow-
ers' 38 express a functional commitment to a system that permits in-
dividual judges to avoid the restrictiveness of judge-made rules and
to devise flexible new approaches to achieve a "just" or "fair" result.
The admission that law and morality have an intrinsic symbiotic re-
lationship is no longer thought troublesome, and judges are given
wide latitude in exercising individual judgment for the general wel-
fare.39 The role of coercion in this context, though recognized by
33. Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL. L. REV. 87, 90-92 (1916). The shift of
some of the Royal prerogative to the Chancellor is described in I. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW,401-04 (7th ed. 1956).
34. "Where there is a right, there is a remedy."
35. A. DICEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 198 (1959).
36. Id at 199.
37. In the words of one noted commentator, "[N]o United Kingdom court is competent
to question the validity of an Act of Parliament." S.A. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 67 (1971).
38. See note 5 and accompanying text supra
39. See generally R. NEWMAN, EQUITY & LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 11-12, 36-37
(1961).
scholars' and commentators4 as having crucial import to the chan-
cellor's remedial efficacy, is less openly addressed by the courts than
is the issue of flexibility. Typical is the subtly sinister language in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,42 a school de-
segregation case: "If school authorities fail in their affirmative obli-
gations under these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked.
Once a right and violation have been shown, the scope of a district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad. . .. ,,4 Al-
though the language in Swann is quite circumspect, the breadth of
the power is more fully expressed in the federal contempt statute:
"A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority. . . as
. . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command."
The enormous impact that even potential contempt proceedings
have upon parties to judicial proceedings cannot be completely un-
derstood by one who has not been directly involved. The sense is
accurately conveyed by one commentator discussing implementation
of the remedial decree in a well known public law case:
When the administration began to refuse the [court-ap-
pointed oversight committee] access to staff members and files, the
committee obtained an order from the court instructing the de-
fendants to cooperate. This order was supported by the same
power of contempt that would be used to enforce a subpoena is-
sued by a traditional master or receiver. Toward the end of the
two year implementation period the court issued an order requir-
ing the defendants to show cause why they had not complied with
the [committee] recommendations, even though some of these rec-
ommendations were not explicitly covered by the original decree.45
In most instances, the confluence of flexibility and coercion in
injunctive proceedings is inherently controlled by the traditional lim-
itation on injunctive orders to be negative, specific restraints di-
rected at particular individuals. In the newer cases, courts have
disregarded these restraints as inadequate and have exerted author-
ity over a comprehensive pattern of activity for a protracted period
40. See J. POMEROY, A TREATISE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE - (1941). Seegeneraly
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES, 93 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Comment, Utilization of Neoreceiverships, supra note 2.
42. 402 U.S. 1 (1974).
43. Id at 15.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1977).
In Griffin v. County School Bd., 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1966), the court affirmed a con-
tempt order under 18 U.S.C. § 401 based upon acts committed before any order was issued.
The court reasoned thus: "Although this court had not issued an injunction . . . the Board
knew that if the plaintiffs succeeded this would be its ultimate decree. . . . That potential
decree was thus then within the statute." Id at 210. See also Faubus v. United States, 254
F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958) Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957).
45. Comment, The Wyatt Case.- Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional
Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1363-64 (1975) (discussing Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971)) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Wyatt Case].
of time. Before the remedies arising in federal litigation that chal-
lenges the operation of state and local government institutions can
be coalesced into a satisfactory conceptual framework, the Court
must reconcile two lines of cases.
In Ex Parte Young,4 6 decided in 1908, the Supreme Court up-
held federal court power to issue negative injunctions against state
officials who were violating federal constitutional rights. In Edelman
v. Jordan,47 decided in 1974, the Court refused to grant direct mone-
tary relief in the form of damages for violation of federal constitu-
tional rights, although it re-affirmed the power to enjoin future
action by state officials in the same circumstances. Finally, in Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer,41 decided in 1976, the Court upheld congressional
power to legislate a damages remedy in implementing fourteenth
amendment rights. Under these cases federal courts can prevent ac-
tions by state officials, including the expenditure of funds, to protect
constitutional rights, but may not require affirmative expenditure of
state funds absent congressional authorization.49
Yet, in the second line of cases, the public law cases, federal
judges have had great latitude in devising and enforcing remedies
based upon their individual judgments concerning public policy and
administrative implementation. ° More importantly, in effecting
these remedies they have often required state and local governments
to institute changes costing millions of dollars, a result that is clearly
46. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state attorney general was enjoined from pursuing a state court
remedy to enforce improper rate regulations).
47. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court upheld federal court power requiring state officials to
conform to federal requirements for processing public assistance applications, but refused to
allow monetary awards to welfare applicants denied benefits under invalid procedures. The
Court found no important distinction between damages and 'retroactive benefits' as a quasi-
injunctive remedy: It was the impact upon the public treasury that was crucial. New limits
upon congressional power to require expenditure or reallocation of state funds in nonconstitu-
tional areas were announced in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
48. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Decided the same day as National League of Cities, Fitzpatrick
continues the development of a judicial deference to congressional initiative in fourteenth
amendment cases. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) with Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which is perhaps indicative of a general posture of deference
in public interest cases, compare United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) with Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
49. Tribe has suggested that National League of Cities can be understood logically to
preclude federal interference with state government functions when services to individuals
would be hampered. Tribe, Unravelling National League of Cities." The New Federalism and
Affrmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1102 (1977). It
appears, however, that the present decisions cannot be reconciled without reference to some
more general principle that will perforce require at least one of the decisions to be overruled.
The most likely approach would be to recognize that the race discrimination cases are sui
generis in American jurisprudence, and that in all other areas federalism limits federal court
oversight of state financial expenditures, including judicial supervision of operating state pro-
grams.
50. Commenting on the recent conversion of constitutional adjudication into a weapon
of reform, Archibald Cox stated, "A judge who believes in progress and in special judicial
responsibility for values and groups not adequately represented in the political process will
find it natural, if not obligatory, to require the revision of old laws and settled government
practices inconsistent with what he believes to be national ideals." Cox, supra note 4, at 802.
incompatible with the broad principle laid down in Young, Edelman
and Fitzpatrick.5 A striking example of a judge mandating compre-
hensive reform in the ongoing activity of a large institution is Wyatt
v. Stickney.
52
The action in Wyatt was originally instituted by mental health
workers at Bryce Hospital, an Alabama mental health care facility,
but was converted at the judge's suggestion to a class action on be-
half of the mentally ill in state institutions. 3 The representatives of
the class sought comprehensive reorganization and improvement of
the health services, which the court mandated and supervised. The
decree was long and covered many areas, involving the court in deci-
sions ranging from the operation of the physical facilities to appro-
priate psychological treatment. When the court encountered
resistence to the reforms, it called in both the United States Attorney
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In all, the proceeding was
pending for over three years and cost the parties millions of dol-
lars,54 though no overall estimate of judicial time and effort ex-
pended is available.
Although Wyatt has been cited often as a prime example of
court initiated institutional reform,55 it does not stand alone. Other
courts have undertaken similar reforms of which the most prominent
examples are the school desegregation cases. 6 Given the increase in
these cases, one must ask whether the judiciary can properly order
51. The principle underlying the eventual synthesis of these two lines of cases may be in
the process of development in fight of the decision last term in Monell v. Department of Social
Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In overruling portions of Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), the Court held that local government entities were proper party defendants to
federal law suits based upon constitutional claims. The Court further refined the model, how-
ever, by limiting the liability of the entity to wrongful actions or policies undertaken by high
level officials with broad administrative responsibilities, such as the mayor or heads of major
departments. Id. at 694. By adding this carefully balanced principle to the conceptual 'mix' of
the earlier decisions discussed in the text, one can speculate that the Court would find it expe-
dient in future cases to re-draw the lines of immunity along functional paths such as the expen-
diture of substantial sums of money, or of monies not presently allocated by the legislature.
This approcah has been implicity recognized by some members of the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Edelman v. Jordon 415 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1976) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In the interim
however, courts are faced with an unresolved conflict of principles that has resulted in the
ratification of injunctions having major direct affects upon the nature and amount of funds
expended by state and local governments in performing government services.
52. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) hearings on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341,
(M.D. Ala.) enforced 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. The theory of the action was that the conditions in the hospitals violated the patients'
constitutional rights.
54. One commentator, who carefully traces the history of the remedial phase in Wyatt,
notes that one institution alone spent over a million dollars on capital improvements related to
the decree. Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra, note 45, at 1372 n.200. For a similar, but even
more detailed, study and evaluation of the remedial phase in Prison reform cases, see Harris
and Spiller, After Decision: Implementation o/Decrees In Correctional Settings (Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration 1977).
55. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 817; Time, Jan 22, 1979, at 91.
56. 'The court determines which students will be assigned to each school, how teachers
shall be selected, what security measures shall be adopted, and where new schools shall be
the expenditure of state funds and the detailed reorganization of
state institutions on a regular basis with no check other than the in-
stincts of its judges and the ad hoc review of appellate tribunals. The
consequences of these remedial experiments are enormous. At mini-
mum, there exists great potential for mischief when a court becomes
involved over long periods of time in the ongoing operation of state
and local government institutions. Either the resources of the judici-
ary will have to be dramatically increased57 or, and perhaps most
disturbing, it will have to enforce constitutional guarantees selec-
tively, even haphazardly.
C. Peculiar Nature of the Judge's Involvement
Before proposing the procedural reforms that are necessary to
give order to an extremely complex process, it is best to begin with a
catalogue of characteristics common to institutional reform cases.
Although the courts have formulated public law remedies mostly on
an ad hoc basis, many aspects of the problems and the courts' efforts
to solve them fall into discernable patterns. Familiarity with the fol-
lowing outline of common elements will facilitate understanding of
the proposed procedural innovations, which are essentially intended
to alleviate uncertainity and confusion for the court and the par-
ties:
58
(1) The initial finding by the court entails a constitutional
deprivation that can, in the court's view, be corrected best
through extensive affirmative measures by an agency of state
government.5 9
(2) The court is unable to identify specifically those ac-
tions that will prevent the deprivation from continuing in the
future.6°
(3) The implementation of the judicial decision will affect
built. When transportation is required, the court directs the expenditure of hundreds of
thousands of dollars." Cox, supra, note 4, at 814 (footnotes omitted).
For other examples of judicial social reform, see, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482
(N.D. Miss. 1975), afl'd, 525 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1976) (court ordered rewriting of prison rules
and rebuilding of prison facilities); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974)
(court specified, inter alia, the workload of staff social workers, the training possessed by prison
psychologists, and a coeducational living environment).
57. R. BERGER supra note 14, at 506 (calling for 132 additional federal judges). The
enormous growth of litigation and the inability of the courts to dispose of pending cases with
dispatch call forth uncomfortable comparison with the state of the English Chancery Courts of
1800 to 1850. See note 30 supra
58. For a similar morphology of public law litigation, see Chayes, supra note 4, at 1302.
See also Hinkle, Appellate Supervision ofRemedies in Public Law Adjudication, 4 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 411 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd and
rem'd, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 758-69
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
60. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
large numbers of persons, most of whom are not parties to the
litigation.6"
(4) Costs of implementation are unknown, but are sub-
stantial.62
(5) The government agency is resistant to the court's find-
ings.
6 3
(6) The matters in issue require analysis by experts or
specialists before implementation can be effected. 64
(7) The long-range success potential is problematic or
doubtful.65
Furthermore, certain general aspects of the remedial phase tend
to characterize these cases:
(1) The court initially formulates a general, tentative goal,
usually phrased in terms of the constitutional values to be pro-
tected but with little specific content.66
(2) Actual implementation is delegated to the defendants
or to a court-appointed official who has factfinding and advisory
functions.67
(3) The court receives informal periodic reports, often
making many "fine-tuning" adjustments in the remedy over
time.68
(4) Court involvement continues over a lengthy period.
69
(5) Parties operate under the aura of judicial coercion,
contempt of court being an overt or barely concealed method of
controlling behavior.7 °
(6) Costs are substantial, but are rarely considered di-
rectly by the court.7 '
61. See notes 7 and 9 supra.
62. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); note 54 supra.
63. This occurs in almost all public law cases.
64. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Turner
v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1965). The issue has been well stated by the Hon. John
J. Degnan, Attorney General for New Jersey, in an address to the New Jersey Bar Association:
"When the courts find violations of constitutional rights which necessitate the power of the
purse, they should allow other branches of government sufficient flexibility to devise an ac-
commodation of such needs and defer to 'good faith' attempts to meet those obligations."
Reported in the Newark Star Ledger, Nov. 10, 1978, at 10.
65. See Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra note 45; see also Note Monitors - 4 New Equi-
table Remedy? 70 YALE L.J. 103, 112-15 (1960).
66. See note 59 supra.
67. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Knight
v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
68. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
69. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 156 (1965) (approving "indefinite"
retention of jurisdiction to "enter such order as justice from time to time might require").
70. See note 61 and accompanying text supra
71. Courts generally dismiss the cost element by holding that fiscal impact is not relevant
in cases of constitutional violation. See, e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d
194 (8th Cir. 1974).
D. Objections to the Remedial Phase in Public Law Cases
Examined
As the preceding list indicates, when a trial judge fashions a
remedy in a public law case, he may, indeed must, proceed tenta-
tively and intuitively over a long period of time to gather factual
data, policy recommendations, and projections of future events, and
to apply that information and devise or approve remedial measures
to alter institutional conditions affecting large numbers of people.
For the most part the legitimating factor is not the concurrence of
the defendants, but the 'inherent equitable power' of contempt held
over those who resist the judicial mandate. Three major objections
to this species of judicial activity must be answered if courts are to
continue exercising these powers.
The first objection is based upon the principle of federalism,
long recognized as fundamental to our form of government and re-
cently and vigorously reaffirmed in National League of Cities v.
Usery. 72 Although the Court in National League of Cities obviously
reasserted the broad principle that a division of powers between the
central government and those of the states is desirable, the court did
not retreat from the comprehensive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that it recently adopted in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States. 73 Rather, the Court actually left open for the moment the
question of inter-governmental immunity in cases involving Con-
gress' civil rights powers under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment. That question was decided in favor of congressional authority
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,74 in which the Court distinguished Edelman v.
Jordan," while explicitly declining to question its validity. Indeed,
the Court said, "Our analysis begins where Edelman left off, for in
this Title VII case the threshold fact of congressional authorization
to sue the State as employer is clearly present."76 Thus, as noted ear-
lier, the Court has determined that Congress, but not the courts, can
impose direct fiscal sanctions upon state and local governments in
72. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court held that blanket extension of federal wage and hour
provisions to state and local government employees violated state immunities under the tenth
amendment.
Tribe points out that while National League of Cities is ostensibly a decision about states'
rights, it can also be considered a decision about individual rights, since a "focus on individual
rights is hardly inconsistent with a concern for federalism." Tribe, supra note 49, at 1078.
73. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
74. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
75. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In Edelman .the Supreme Court had refused to recognize retro-
active welfare benefits as an appropriate equitable remedy even though the lower court had
explicitly found that recalcitrance and deliberate evasion were part and parcel of the welfare
officials' pattern of activity prior to and during the litigation. The ground for the decision was
that the eleventh amendment as applied under Ex Parte Young continued to preclude mone-
tary relief that was a direct drain upon the state treasury, no matter what nominal label the
relief bore.
76. 427 U.S. at 452.
cases arising under the fourteenth amendment. Since the remedies,
as well as the litigation, in public law cases in the federal courts char-
acteristically have a significant fiscal impact upon the state treas-
ury,77 when the remedies in those cases involve budgetary
adjustments not within the present capabilities of the particular
agency involved in the litigation, the federal courts must exercise
their judicial authority cautiously if they are to remain consistent
with the underlying principles of the Federalism cases.
The second objection is that the courts in public law cases have
improperly departed from their traditional passive, arbitral role, al-
tering the separation of powers doctrine.7" Chayes recognizes this
shift, but does not find it troublesome.79 Other commentators have
contended that though the shift is occurring, the courts are forced to
act in an unorthodox fashion because the other branches of govern-
ment have defaulted in their obligations.8" Even if the latter conten-
tion is true, it is relevant only when examining the question of the
court's involvement in troublesome areas of constitutional law,8" not
the methods they use to implement their decisions. The courts
should, whenever possible, use these methods consistent with the ju-
dicial model of careful, analytical, and critical fact finding, utilizing
the procedural safeguards of the rules of evidence and cross-exami-
nation to evaluate the information proffered to the court. The reme-
dial phase of public law cases entails ongoing and complex fact
finding and, often fact prediction.82 It is striking that courts fre-
quently abandon the rules of evidence throughout this phase and
even delegate the crucial fact finding function to special masters,
monitors, observers, or other deputies.8 3 Furthermore, the court is
often involved in the administration of the agency in an active and
comprehensive capacity. Finally, the time frame is extended and
sometimes indefinite. All of these departures from traditional judi-
cial functions obscure, or even remove, the distinction between
77. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
78. This criticism is elaborated in Note, Monitors, A New Equitable Remedy? 70 YALE
L.J. 103, 117 (1960).
It has been aptly said that "[jiustifying the federal role is nowhere more difficult than with
regard to public law remedies, and the relationship between district and appellate courts may
greatly affect both the perception and thefact of judicial integrity. " Hinkle, supra note 58, at 413
(emphasis added). Former United States Attorney General Archibold Cox has observed that
"It]he Court becomes less of a court in the old fashioned sense and more of a roving commis-
sion charged with deciding whether other branches of government are observing constitutional
limitations." Cox, supra note 4, at 808.
79. Chayes, supra note 4, at 1314-15.
80. See Comment, Utilization of Neoreceiverships, supra note 2, at 1199-1200.
81. The distinction between involvement and choice of remedy is clearly drawn. See
Cox, supra note 4, at 812-13.
82. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text supra; Cox, supra note 4, at 815.
83. There is no reason to delegate the judge's fact finding function to an appointee
merely because predictions and estimates are entailed, for the process still is grounded upon
concrete, present evidence that forms the basis for inferences, usually aided by expert opinion.
courts and administrative tribunals. Only the judge's contempt
power remains in force.
Public acceptance of judicial intervention in these cases is con-
ditioned upon judicial acceptance of the responsibility to retain the
mechanism of judicious fact finding as protection against capricious
actions. In other words, although courts cannot, and probably
should not, withdraw from these controversies merely because sepa-
ration of powers is said to be substantively threatened, 84 courts
should, to the extent possible, continue to behave procedurally as
courts in notifying affected parties, ascertaining facts, selecting reme-
dies, and verbalizing the bases for their decisions.85
The third major objection to judicial activism in public law
cases is that the courts are behaving contrary to basic principles of
democracy. Essentially, this argument, which forms the basis for the
most vocal popular criticism,86 posits that since judges are not sub-
ject to popular election, they are not appropriate spokesmen in areas
of social policy.87
The substantive objections to this criticism can be met by the
assertion that it is precisely because judges are not elected by the
popular will that they are well-suited to this type of reform.8 8 They
are not subject to constituent pressure and, therefore, can more
freely be neutral on questions that arouse irrational prejudice and
popular sentiment. Nevertheless, negative public impressions are re-
inforced by the secrecy of the remedial phase, the informality of the
proceedings, and the lack of notification to many of the persons di-
rectly affected by the court's decrees. Hence, in the long run the
appearance of unfairness may fatally undermine public respect for
the judiciary even in the absence of actual impropriety.
84. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court refined the political question issue
and distinguished the functioning of a coordinate branch from the manner of selecting the
members of that branch. The question of remedy, however, has proven far more difficult. See,
e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (multimember districts are ordinarily permissible in
plans drawn under court order by the defendants, but not ordinarily permissible in plans
drawn by the court itself).
85. See Hinkle, supra note 58, at 426.
86. See notes 13 & 16 supra.
87. See T. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962).
88. Chayes notes that "the judiciary may have some important institutional advantages
for the tasks it is assuming." Chayes, supra note 4, at 1307. These advantages include the
following:
[a] professional tradition that insulates [the federal judge] from narrow political pres-
sures . . . , some experience of the political process; and acquaintance with a fairly
broad range of public policy problems. Moreover, he is governed by a professional
ideal of reflective and dispassionate analysis of the problem before him and is likely
to have had some experience in putting this ideal into practice.
Id at 1307-08. Two other advantages that Chayes recognizes are that the judiciary is non-
bureaucratic and that the adversarial structure provides a strong incentive for the parties to
furnish information. Id at 1308.
III. Evaluation and Proposals for Reform
Judicial independence, efficacy, and integrity may be said to de-
pend fundamentally upon a neutral and deliberative decision-mak-
ing process. The English Chancery courts evolved both substantive
and procedural rules to insure consistency and predictability in their
decisions. This evolution was essential even though the British judi-
ciary was uniformly subject to direct control by the Crown and by
Parliament.89 In the United States, courts enjoy substantially greater
independence from the other two branches of the federal govern-
ment and have broad powers over many aspects of State and local
governments through the Federal Constitution.9 ° Although some
have argued that this expansive power over other branches is institu-
tionally unsound, and that the only viable solution is to divest the
federal courts of substantial segments of its present jurisdiction over
these governmental entities,9 ' two reasons support the judicial role
in policing the other branches of government.
First, the enormous growth of government in modernized socie-
ties carries the direct threat of oppression. The courts have provided,
and must continue to provide, a valuable check upon the excesses of
governmental activity. Indeed, much of the need for judicial activ-
ism arises from the inaction of the other branches. 92Although re-
jected by the strict constructionists,93 this argument is generally
accepted by the vast majority of those involved in, or affected by,
government action.
Second, few have seriously criticized the motivation or integrity
of any of the literally hundreds of judges who have been involved in
institutional reform. Thus far the judiciary has uniformly acted with
restraint and caution, perhaps in some instances to the detriment of
those seeking reform.94 The decisions and the literature suggest that
courts may well have shown far more honesty, fairness, and insight
89. Initially the Chancellor was an administrative deputy of the King. See note 25 supra.
In modern times British courts have been subject to legislative override in all cases, including
those involving constitutional issues. See generally deSmith, supra note 37, at 67.
90. Berger critically discusses the development of federal power over state governments
through the Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts. His historical analysis of the
background of the fourteenth amendment leads him to the conclusion that
the framers chose words which aptly expressed, and throughout were wedded to,
their limited purposes . . . . [Tihere is virtually no evidence that the framers meant
to resort to those words [due process and equal protection] to open goals beyond
those specified in the Civil Rights Act. . . . If the terms of the amendment are vague,
it is because the Court made them so in order to shield the expanding free enterprise
system from regulation.
R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 167-68. For a surprising speculation on the logical progression of
these developments, see Tribe, supra note 49.
91. See, e.g., R. BERGER,, supra note 13, at 407-08.
92. See Comment, Utilization of NeoReceiverships, supra note 2, at 1199; see also Cox,
supra note 4, at 802.
93. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 13.
94. See Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra note 45, at 1376-77.
in identifying major social issues and in dealing with them than have
the other branches of government.
Considering these arguments together, one can conclude that
the federal courts have justifiably, but nevertheless very clearly, de-
parted from traditional judicial methods for devising remedies in in-
stitutional reform cases. These departures have raised questions
among the general public about the propriety of judicial conduct,
have sacrificed at least the appearance of consistency and predict-
ability, and have hampered appellate control of the process. 95 These
criticisms will continue, and will grow, unless the courts undertake
affirmative procedural reforms designed to restore the integrity of
the decision-making process as perceived by those within and with-
out that process. Six major aspects of the remedial phase in public
law cases require attention and reform.
A. Notice and Parties
One of the most frequently noted aspects of public law litigation
is the impact the remedies have on individuals who are not before
the court during the trial stage.96 In some instances parties may be
added, as plaintiffs or defendants, in the remedial phase as the court
perceives indirect causes of the central problem.97 In other cases
members of the affected group may be excluded from the law suit,98
or members of the general public may be directly injured by judicial
action.99 Finally, state government agencies or officials who are in
the best position to analyze and present information concerning the
fiscal impact of proposed remedies, or information concerning state
financial resources and budgetary processes, may be left out of the
litigation entirely. t°
Moreover, to further deprive parties of any meaningful partici-
pation, several courts and commentators have asserted that the re-
95. See generally Hinde, supra note 58.
96. See generally Chayes, supra note 4 at 189-92; Hinkle, supra note 58, at 412.
97. In Wyatt the action was commenced by mental health workers at one Alabama insti-
tution. At the suggestion of the trial judge, patients were added as plaintiffs and became the
major focus of the law suit. Ironically, many of the workers originally involved as plaintiffs
came to resent and to resist the court's decrees, which called for reforms in the system of
patient management. See Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra note 45, at 1354.
98. Apparently the defendants in Wyatt began to discharge patients at a much higher
rate than usual, which brought claims that they were being 'dumped' to meet court mandated
staff-patient ratios. Nevertheless, Judge Johnson declined to hear these claims on the ground
that discharged patients were no longer part of the litigation, even though discharged patients
were committing bizarre and, in some cases, threatening acts that alarmed and angered local
residents. See id, at 1374, n.208.
99. In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), for example, the Supreme Court affirmed
court-ordered expenditure of general state education funds for compensatory education pro-
grams targeted at Blacks in the Detroit school system.
100. This occurs because of the complex procedural rules involved in federal court juris-
diction over states, state action, and state officials in cases concerning federal constitutional
rights.
medial phase of litigation should be under the direct control and
discretion of the court, with a minimum of influence from the par-
ties.10 ' Although this approach may be justified when the parties
cooperate in the formulation of the remedial decree, this sort of con-
sensus seldom exists. Indeed, it is resistence to the court-ordered re-
forms that most often necessitates continued judicial involvement,
with its coercive implications. 02 Thus, all of the parties should be
involved in traditional adversary roles to guarantee that the informa-
tion the court receives and the decisions based thereon are tested in
the crucible of an adversary proceeding." 3
Reform in these two interrelated areas of procedure entails two
fundamental changes. First, the class of persons notified of the find-
ing of the trial court and of the proposed scope of the remedies under
consideration should be broadened to include all those potentially
affected, regardless whether they meet traditional tests of necessary
parties to the litigation."° And when the decree may have direct im-
pact upon members of the general public, 0 5 notice requirements
should include publication in newspapers of general circulation,
apart from notice to the named parties.
Second, the chief executive officer and the chief fiscal officer of a
State should be notified routinely of all pending proceedings in
which proposed injunctive remedies may require substantial expend-
itures of public funds."°6 In addition, these officials should be au-
thorized by court rule10 7 to intervene in any such proceeding for the
purpose of presenting evidence concerning the projected fiscal im-
pact of the remedies under consideration without waiving any im-
munity that exists under the tenth or eleventh amendment. 10 8 The
101. See generally Chayes, supra note 4, at 1300-01; see Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra
note 45, at 1366. In Wyatt the court directed the plaintiff's attorneys to refrain from active
participation in the remedial phase, arrogating sole responsibility for that portion of the pro-
ceeding to the court itself. Id at n.177.
102. See Comment, Utilization of Neoreceiverships, supra note 2, at 1178-79.
103. Oral testimony under oath subject to cross-examination before a court that has the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness is at the heart of the American system of
judicial procedure and should not be displaced, absent unique or extraordinary circumstances.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 has evolved a concept of necessary parties that is based upon
realistic considerations of practicality, rather than antiquated notions of strict necessity. See
Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
105. This impact may be based upon projections of substantial fiscal consequences or
upon possible direct physical consequences, e.g., the revision of a local zoning code.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(6) presently authorizes, but does not require, service upon the
chief executive officer of the state, municipal organization, or other governmental organization
subject to suit. Judicial doctrine that balances the tension between governmental immunity
and constitutional rights, however, has unnecessarily introduced fictitious and artificial
designation of parties. Rule 4 should require service upon a designated official, which could
be done by state option under the borrowing provision of 4(d)(7).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 is presently designed to deal primarily with private litigation and
contains a mandatory and a permissive provision. Rule 24(a) should be amended to reflect the
right of state officials to intervene in public law cases.
108. The Supreme Court has held that waiver of immunity in these situations is not to be
lightly inferred absent a clear showing of knowing and intentional conduct. Edelman v. Jor-
value of the budgetary information that would be supplied is signifi-
cant compared to the risk that state immunity would be broadened
by this approach. To date, the courts have given only minimal con-
sideration to claims of fiscal impact in these cases, reasoning that
constitutional rights cannot be measured in dollars.0 9 This reason-
ing is not persuasive, however, when the court is engaged in weigh-
ing alternative remedies, for each of several possible choices might
'vindicate' the right, so that cost factors may inform the discretion of
the court in selecting the best result. At a time when the cost of
government has produced a significant tax burden at the federal,
state, and local levels, no branch of government can afford the lux-
ury of ignoring monetary considerations. In National League of
Cities, for example, the Supreme Court carefully reviewed state
claims of projected adverse financial impact from the extension of
federal wage provisions to state government workers and accepted
those claims notwithstanding express congressional findings that
such projections were inaccurate." 0
By improving the notice provisions and by broadening the right
to participate in the remedial phase, the courts will enhance the
quality of their factual inquiry and, at the same time, will enhance
public perceptions of the integrity of the judicial process. The public
has a right to know the extent of judicially mandated public expendi-
tures. '
dan, 415 U.S. 651, 67 1-74 (1974). This should not be confused with waiver of immunity based
upon the proprietary or non-governmental nature of the underlying conduct. See, e.g., Parden
v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
109. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974). Fiscal impact
was held to be of minimal relevance in evaluating constitutional issues in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
110. In an amicus brief filed on behalf of Senator Williams (D-NJ) and others, there was
presented to the Court a detailed account of the lengthy process of analysis undertaken by
Congress in estimating fiscal impact of the measures, which resulted in a congressional finding
that the impact would be relatively slight [brief on file at Seton Hall Law Center].
11l. In some cases it appears that legislators' and administrators' reluctance to implement
needed fiscal reform stems from unfounded fear of public resistance. For example, in Robin-
son v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 67 N.J. 473 (1973), a case concerning the New Jersey school
finance crisis, the judiciary demonstrated that its perception of public opinion was more de-
tached and more accurate than that of the legislature. Robinson involved a direct and acrimo-
nious confrontation between the state judiciary and the legislature concerning the financing of
public education in New Jersey. The court mandated statewide comparability for education
under a state constitutional provision requiring a 'thorough and efficient' education for all
children in the state. It soon became clear that a state income tax was the only feasible method
of implementing the decision. Not until several years had passed and the court threatened to
close all the schools in the state, however, did the legislature reluctantly enact the tax. The
reaction at the polls in the following general election was by all accounts nil.
Nevertheless, following the conclusion of the long controversary, Chief Justice Hughes
reflected, "Despite our judicial and enormous administrative powers given us by the Constitu-
tion, I think we realized we couldn't change everything and make everything perfect in the
social scheme. These experiences taught me a new respect for the parameters of the court's
potential." Interview with Chief Justice Hughes, Newark Star Ledger, May 30, 1977, at I.
B. Evidenliary Hearings in the Remedial Phase
The integrity of the judicial process depends directly upon the
method by which the court receives and evaluates the information
that underlies its decisions. Although the primary mode is still oral
testimony by witnesses in open court subject to the critical scrutiny
of cross-examination, courts have departed from these safeguards in
recent years, particularly in cases tried without a jury." 2 Moreover,
the remedial phase of public law cases often entails far more negotia-
tion, informal reporting, and conferencing, 3 than is normally iden-
tified with judicial proceedings.' ' The disconcerting similarity to
the early ninetenth century Chancery Courts in England is striking.
Following the reform of Chancery by the adoption of consistently
applied substantive rules for decision,' '5 that court was severely and
correctly criticized for its major procedural failures, the informality
of evidentiary proceedings, and particularly the routine reference of
factual issues to masters who were both corrupt and incompetent. In
the modem context Judge Kaufman has accurately described the use
of masters and referees in federal courts as posing two major dan-
gers:
[First, d]eterminations by a master are made without all of the
legal and institutional safeguards intended to assure the selection
of a competent judiciary. American policy, stated quite simply,
upholds the right of a litigant to have his suit tried before a judge
and jury if he so requests. [Second, a]nother major limitation on
the employment of masters is the likelihood that a reference will
add appreciably to the cost and length of litigation." 6
Even when the master's findings are only advisory, the court has
little basis to critically evaluate and refine them. In public law cases
any interested party should be permitted to present evidence in the
remedial phase, subject to the traditional requirement-competent
testimony exposed to cross-examination. Anecdotal reports, over-
sight commissions, special masters, and omsbudsmen are not appro-
112. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 428 (3d ed. 1976). The right to a jury
trial does not exist in most public law cases, absent congressional authorization. See generally
Lorillard v. Pons, 46 U.S.L.W. 4150 (Feb. 21, 1978).
113. See note 8 supra. Courts have frequently appointed individuals or boards to study
the general problem and prepare reports and recommendations. See, e.g., Hart v. Community
School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afld, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
114. In Wyatt v. Stickney, the court derived its information from a 'human rights commit-
tee' that was appointed by the court and contained no mental health professionals. The com-
mittee invited workers and patients to appear before it, but had the court's authority to coerce
cooperation if necessary. When patient mistreatment in retaliation for complaints became an
issue, the judge did not hesitate to bring in FBI officials to investigate and report. Comment,
The Wyatt Case, supra, note 45, at 1362-65. See also Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.
1974) (affirming use of monitor to report on implementation).
115. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
116. Kaufman, The Use of Masters in Federal Courts, 58 COL. L. REV. 452, 458 (1958).
This excellent article is primarily concerned with the stringent limitations upon the use of
masters under FED. R. Civ. P. 53, although Judge Kaufman notes the inherent power of fed-
eral courts to appoint masters in aid of equity decrees.
priate in judicial proceedings and should not be utilized." 7 The
parties should maintain an active and primary role in the presenta-
tion and evaluation of information. 18
C Formulation and Scope of the Injunction
At the present time courts approach the actual decree with con-
siderable variation and experimentation. Generally, the court first
permits the defendant to formulate its own plan for reform, which is
successful in relatively few cases" 9 and entails substantial delay.'2 °
Next, the court may direct negotiations between the parties, some-
times under the guidance of 'experts' from several disciplines rele-
vant to the problem at hand.' 2 ' Finally, the court will formulate an
injunction to be obeyed under penalty of contempt.
In some instances, the court is concerned with altering specific
conduct by the defendants; for example, by prohibiting the use of
drugs for patient control rather than for treatment. 122 When this is
the court's goal, the decree meets the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65(d): "Every order granting an injunction...
shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not
by reference to . . .other document[s], the act or acts sought to be
restrained."' 123 More often, however, the court is concerned with
more general reform, undertaking to mandate 'adequate' treatment,
'thorough and efficient education,' or other similar institutional
117. The reasons against the use of such informal information sources by courts are set
forth more fully in Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARV. L. REV. 779,
787 (1975). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECSLER, HART AND WEC-
SLERS'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 396 (2d ed. 1973).
118. One noted authority put it thus:
American lawyers' fondness for the adversary system and for restricting the role of
the judge rests upon. . . the ... premise that courts ought not to function as self-
propelled vehicles ofjustice and right. . . .Judges are not expected to go about look-
ing for law suits; or compelling persons to sue who do not desire to do so; or insisting
that a person sue for every grievance he has once he does desire to bring an action.
M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, et al, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (3d ed. 1976).
119. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1067 (1965). See
also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Chayes, supra note 4,
at 1299 suggests that negotiation is the norm in this situation and that it generally produces
satisfactory results. Nevertheless, it is especially clear from the desegregation cases that state
and local government officials have few qualms about avoiding implementation of a judicial
decision that they feel is unfair or unwarranted.
120. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); Karpral v. Jepson, 271
F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1967).
121. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist., 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974), af 'd, 413 U.S. 189
(1973); Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd, 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
122. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) (court promulgated specific guidelines for dispensing behavior-modification drugs to
inmates, but did not police implementation or become involved in overall therapeutic treat-
ment plan).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
goals. 124 In those cases, the court is forced to supervise actively the
implementation of the decree and to 'fine tune' its orders in light of
further experience. 21 This in turn leads to a series of progress re-
ports by which the parties or a master informs the court as to the
success of implementation, which is followed by a stern warning
from the court that the defendants must do better on pain of con-
tempt.
There are several reasons why courts adopt a nonspecific ap-
proach. The court may be unwilling to choose between two conflict-
ing schools of expertise in the area, 126 electing instead to experiment
with various approaches. Or the court may 'legislate' general goals,
with the details to be fleshed out by the experts. Finally, the court
actually may be masking efforts to force nonparties to provide assist-
ance such as a substantially increased legislative appropriation of
funds for the program under supervision. Whatever the motivation,
however, the result generally has been confusion, uncertainty, ex-
pense, and substantial delay. Notwithstanding the integrity, ability,
and dedication of the judges involved in these cases, it is increasingly
clear that the courts have neither the resources nor the actual
power 12  to achieve significant successes by formulating broad de-
crees. 1
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To correct this problem, appellate courts should require that in-
junctions literally meet the specificity requirements of rule 65(d). In
those cases involving a general failure to discharge a duty to provide
services in violation of the Federal Constitution, the appropriate
124. In Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), the court devised a standard for imple-
menting the right to treatment that included the following three elements: adequate staff num-
bers, a humane physical and psychological environment, and individualized treatment
planning for each patient. The court's actual decree enjoined the defendants from failing to
implement fully and with dispatch each of the elements. Id at 394. See Comment, The Wyatt
Case, supra, note 45, at 1343.
"Thorough and efficient education" has been adopted by the New Jersey court as part of
the state constitution in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). In cases involv-
ing mental institutions and correctional facilities (particularly for juvenile offenders, sex psy-
chopaths, etc.) the courts have elevated to a constitutional level the philosophy that each
inmate/patient should be the subject of individualized treatment planning. This theory of
treatment is currently in vogue, but is far from accepted doctrine. One difficulty with it as a
complete theory of treatment is that it leaves no room for those cases that are, given current
scientific and financial limits, not amenable to any meaningful treatment, or that can be
treated only at enormous cost.
125. See Note, Monitors, a New Equitable Remedy, 70 YALE L.J. 103 (1960).
126. The decree [in Wyatt] embodied potentially conflicting goals which represent
two divergent mental health philosophies. One favors . . . the 'least restrictive alter-
native' . . . . The other proposes . . . maintenance of the basic institutional frame-
work. . . . Neither the court, the parties nor the amici directly addressed the
question of whether the choice between the two approaches was a constitutional one,
appropriately made by the court, or a professional one, properly left to the discretion
of the state officials.
Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra note 45, at 1371.
127. See note I ll supra
128. See Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra note 45, at 1379; see also Note, Monitors, A
New Equitable Remedy?, 70 YALE L.J. 103, 118-20 (1960).
remedy should be damages 29 or declaratory relief. In addition, the
further requirement of rule 65(d) that judges give reasons for the
issuance of an injunction 30 should be construed or amended to re-
quire detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law meeting the
standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 for the judge's deci-
sion after a non-jury trial.' 3 '
D. Fiscal Impact of the Decree
Courts have consistently held that fiscal considerations are of
little moment when balanced against constitutional rights.' 32  In
cases concerning desegregation, 133 public benefits programs, 34 and
inmate rehabilitation 35 the courts have generally ignored both the
cost of the mandated relief and the cost of the proceeding by which
the court reached its decision. 36 With the dramatic growth of judi-
cial oversight of government programs, through both constitutional
adjudication and direct legislative authorization, the increasingly
costly process of civil litigation and its results have become a major
part of state and local government budgets. 37  Given this increase,
courts would be irresponsible to totally ignore cost factors in evaluat-
ing policy alternatives. They could assess the costs and determine
that the constitutional interests involved outweigh them, but it is un-
realistic and unfair to disregard financial considerations completely.
Justice Burger has called upon legislators explicitly to assess "judi-
cial impact" of all legislation by projecting the extent and expense of
litigation generated by each new law.'38 Rather than endeavor to
achieve a perfect Pr ideal solution to the general problem, courts
129. See Tribe, supra note 49, at 1102. It is entirely likely that damages awarded even to
classes of plaintiffs would be less expensive than litigation and compliance with complex insti-
tutional injunctions.
130. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
131. At present Rule 52(a) requires findings in every case granting or refusing interlocu-
tory injunctions. The provision is frequently ignored or loosely met, however, by a statement
at the end of the court's decision reading substantially as follows: "This decision shall consti-
tute the court's findings."
132. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); see also cases cited at
note 105 supra.
133. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
134. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
135. For a listing of typical cases, see Comment The Wyatt Case supra note 45, at 1341,
n.14.
136. Courts have never seriously attempted to do a cost analysis of the litigation process
by measuring the hours of time needed by the judge and supporting court personnel, the physi-
cal facilities utilized, the cost of, stenographic services, etc., in the conduct of a major case.
Even attorneys and expert witnesses frequently bill litigation time in terms of days in court
rather than actual time spent.
137. Actions against state and local government bodies have mushroomed in the last dec-
ade. Many municipalities are unable to obtain liability insurance at any reasonable rate, and
increasingly require litigation counsel on a retainer basis. Professor Francis McQuade of Se-
ton Hall Law Center has suggested that a legislative limit be placed on damage awards against
municipalities. Newark Star Ledger, Feb. 22, 1979, at 40.
138. See note 14 supra. See, remarks of Attorney General Degnan, supra note 64.
must consider more openly the cost of various remedies and must
strive to devise a specific remedy in a particular case that will be
effective to redress the constitutional violation. This proposal is
meant to encourage refinement, not rejection, of the principle that
constitutional rights generally outweigh fiscal considerations.
E The Scope of Appellate Review
The approach to appellate review of the trial courts' selection of
remedies in public law cases varies considerably. ' 39 Traditional con-
cepts developed in bipolar private proceedings are inadequate to
deal with orders that have broad effects upon the general public and
that are chosen from an almost infinite variety of possible solu-
tions."4 The problem is not solved, however, by converting trial
judges into fact finding 'masters' to prepare detailed records that
would be subject to de novo appellate review.' 4 ' The volume of ap-
pellate litigation in the federal courts"' and the inefficacy of the trial
court's orders during the substantial period of time pending appel-
late review 4 3 militate strongly against direct reliance upon appellate
courts in this area. Furthermore, most trial attorneys agree that even
modern, sophisticated appellate records are at best a substitute for
the intense involvement of the trial judge in the factual and legal
contours of the controversy.
In the twenty years or so that courts have been engaged in com-
plex institutional remedies, some substantive principles have
emerged to guide trial courts in devising appropriate decrees. Some
of these principles, such as "the scope of the remedy is limited by the
scope of the constitutional violation,"" appear to be of general ap-
plication despite their origin in a particular context, L e., the desegre-
gation cases. Others are more specific, such as the presumptive
preference for single-member districts in some types of legislative re-
apportionment decrees.' 45 Even the more specific principles, how-
ever, provide guidance for a significant number of future trial court
139. See generally Hinkle, supra note 58 for a thoughtful catalogue of the range of appel-
late review and suggestions for reform.
140. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
141. Contra Hinkle, supra note 58, at 430. Hinkle has suggested that, given a sufficient
record and adequate trial findings, appellate courts are equipped to conduct de novo review of
the remedy in each case. Id. This suggestion ignores the need to review each record to insure
that the findings have a basis. Moreover, the suggestion is based on the premise that appeals in
these types of cases are certain, a premise that has merit only as long as the current chaotic
procedures are retained. Furthermore, this type of approach must necessarily exacerbate the
already serious problem of delay encountered in public law cases.
142. See R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 506.
143. See Comment, The Wyatt Case, supra note 45, at 1378.
144. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). "The controlling principle consistently ex-
pounded in our holdings is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent
of the constitutional violation." Id at 744.
145. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
decisions. Appellate review is most effective when it is confined to
these sorts of substantive law considerations and to ensuring that
trial courts have adhered to the procedural requirements outlined
above. Beyond that, orderly disposition of controversies in a reason-
able time and at a reasonable cost dictates that the trial court have
the ability to formulate and enforce its decrees within a time frame
that does not include routine de novo appellate review.
F Duration of the Remedial Phase
Courts are frequently faulted for the glacial slowness of pro-
ceedings during both trials and appeals, even though the criticism is
inaccurate in many instances' 46 and overdrawn when courts are
compared to other branches of government. 47 Nevertheless, pro-
tracted judicial involvement in the ongoing administration of institu-
tions has been one of the more persistent sources of public criticism
and mistrust. Moreover, this sort of continued oversight is beyond
the practical capabilities of a busy trial judge and uniformly results
in delegation of important functions to masters, oversight commit-
tees, or other representatives. It often appears that the termination
of proceedings is precipitated not by a decision that the remedy has
succeeded, but rather by an admission of limited capability or by the
press of other business. Adherence to time limits would discourage
courts from formulating vague, general decrees148 and would ease
public concern that arises when public institutions are being admin-
istered for long periods by non-elected officials.
In general, courts should be required to terminate the remedial
phase of public law cases within one year, unless it appears, and is
found after an evidentiary hearing, that continued judicial involve-
ment is necessary and efficacious. Courts serve a major social func-
tion by identifying constitutional violations and declaring rights.
The inability to implement completely such decisions by injunctive
remedies in every case is by no means a measure of failure or an
admission that those rights do not exist.
146. The efficiency with which certain courts, notably the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, are able to dispose of heavy calendars is remarkable. For some years
the Second Circuit courts have been able to hear appeals on the merits within about four
months after the notice of appeal has been filed, and requires the parties to proceed on such a
schedule absent unusual circumstances. Individual trial judges have accomplished the same or
similar results. Nevertheless, delay continues to be a major perceived weakness in judicial
function. See Report of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 74 F.R.D. 159 (1977).
147. See e.g., White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d. Cir. 1977) (delays in social security
decisions under 42 U.S.C. § 405).
148. See notes 119-31 and accompanying text supra.
IV. Conclusion
Federal court involvement in public law cases with concomitant
growth in the breadth and complexity of injunctive remedies
presents substantial procedural problems. Neither a historical nor a
functional analysis supports an ad hoc individualized approach to
the remedial phase without structure or formality. Indeed, the ab-
sence of traditional judicial procedures in formulating remedies
raises serious and legitimate questions about the propriety of the
remedies, even when the actual results are salutory. Much of the
public unease and judicial confusion can be resolved by imposing
greater structure upon the process by which courts arrive at remedial
decrees in complex public law cases. Without limiting the substan-
tive remedial powers of federal courts, procedures can be adopted
that will require courts to hold evidentiary hearings to resolve issues
of fact pertinent to the remedial phase, to issue findings of fact and
conclusions of law, to give adequate notice and an opportunity to
participate to non-parties who may be affected by the decree, and to
limit the duration of judicial experiments in complex institutional
reform cases. These changes in procedure will facilitate appellate
review, heighten public confidence in the judiciary, and improve the
integrity of the remedial phase.

